[1:44:45] A: aww i shud do philosophy. i.e. im thinking far too much tonite
[1:45:12] lol ahhh why cant i find a purpose in life
[1:45:19] B: hahahaha
[1:45:30] yeah i get like that sometimes
[1:45:33] whats bothering you in particular?
[1:46:57] A: absolute lack of control to even keep my girlfriend... and that whatever i do to make my life seem attractive to her will make seem pointless lol
[1:47:27] why isnt the world just made of a single piece of matter. in fact pretty much why is there a 'world'?
[1:47:44] the very existence of anything doesnt make sense
[1:48:17] B: yeah thats very true
[1:48:30] the world could be just a single piece of matter anyways
[1:48:32] and what really is "matter" that's a human concept
[1:48:49] A: haha yeah true
[1:49:12] the worst bit for me is that there's no answer lol
[1:50:01] B: of course there isn't
[1:50:16] whatever "answer" there is wouldn't be satisfactory
[1:50:53] A: yeah. and thats why i hate the world lol
[1:51:06] this is the perfect reason for alcohol tho =D
[1:54:52] lol also tried to make a super summery nd i guess that im annoyed that i cant achieve my objective in life. probably
[1:54:59] which is to live forever lol
[1:55:20] B: really? that's your objective?
[1:55:26] what do you do once you live forever though lol
[1:55:34] A: well, when i think of what i want, thats what i want lol
[1:55:59] haha well, better to exist than not to. since i started doing it already
[1:56:17] B: guess so
[1:56:33] A: if u start a job, do it properly i reckon lol
[1:56:33] B: but are you any more upset that you missed the year 1800 than you would if you miss the year 2200
[1:57:37] A: lol i am now =P hmmm i see ur point but, i just really dont want to not exist lol
[1:58:35] B: yeah i guess
[1:58:42] but what does it actually mean to "not exist"
[1:59:04] A: well this is the problem lol i guess non-conscienceness
[1:59:50] B: so then why would not existing matter
[1:59:56] since you wouldn't be aware of it
[2:00:07] A: well, because im aware of it now already lol
[2:00:28] ive gotten a taste of life, and dont want the food supply to run out lol
[2:02:32] B: exactly
[2:02:35] but what im saying is
[2:02:43] youll never know when you stop existing
[2:02:54] theres not like a specific day when you know that you will die
[2:03:34] A: so , ahhhh hmmmm ok, so if i wonty know, i shouldnt fear it, because it not pain, its just something tht happens
[2:04:00] B: exactly
[2:04:14] it's something that no one can explain to us, because no ones ever returned from it
[2:04:16] A: hmmm haha but it still annoys me lol
[2:04:23] true
[2:04:32] no i agree i agree, it just still makes me angry haha
[2:04:52] lol thanks =)
[2:05:05] B: it's fine haah i get like this more than anyone i think
[2:05:20] but it's really unhealthy thinking about that, because then you waste what life you have worrying about it
[2:05:28] A: my second problem. how can i find a way to stay with ---. i guess the answer is just to be myself haha urgh no there's just never an answer to anything!
[2:05:36] haha truueee
[2:07:07] urgh i hate existentialism and dialectism and everything. but i do enjoy thinking of it. cos it makes me go on to debate websites and leave annoying comments about how nothing matters... and in fact what theyre arguing about is pointless etc haha
[2:07:49] not religious ones, cos i feel they could hve some worth. but u know, arguing about th news etc
[2:08:38] haha i think id hate to study philosophy too, because there's just no answers in it haha
[2:08:56] B: haha yeah
[2:08:59] theres no point really
[2:09:04] but then theres no point in anything :P
[2:10:05] A: haha i know, ah the number of times i annoyed --- all night tellin her how nothin mattered and she just answered so why bother living... and thus i had no answer and so we just went in circles lol
[2:11:00] B: haha because living is better than not living at the moment?
[2:11:06] and the unknown is scary
[2:11:19] A: haha yeah
[2:11:31] ahhhh it makes sense
[2:12:52] with our limited knowledge, we are constantly choosing to maximise our gains in life, in this case the choice between living or not, since we dunno what else there is, and therefore keep on living
[2:13:04] hah economics u do hve some use
[2:15:32] i now feel strangely better
[2:16:15] B: haha
[2:16:16] good
[2:16:25] its always better when you rant about this sort of stuff :P
[2:17:10] A: yeah true haha just never let me be convinced by someone that the other side is better, cos thts a dangerous turn lol
[2:17:45] even tho loads of ppl believe tht to be true and dnt take their lives lol
[2:18:27] ah ofc, thts why christianity condemns suicide maybe lol
[2:19:17] B: yeah of course it does
[2:19:25] cause if they are selling heaven as better than earth
[2:19:32] why don't people just kill themselves now :P
[2:19:35] A: haha right?
[2:19:42] ah a strange world
Monday 20 December 2010
Sunday 25 April 2010
waitering in Japan times
Excursion -
Part 1 - went to japan, got a job at M- Hotel, onsen and ski-slope hotel, on a mountain. so it begins.
Part 2
16th, got back to M- Hotel and drank 3 cans that night. awoke with a headache.. uncle, auntie and g'ma came up.
met interesting auzzie (possible reggae party in february)
17th, Started first day of work - was canny as K- san (in charge of me) spoke English. Some nice ladies here... - sleepy so missed breakfast again.
19th, I sit... lie in bed, the prospect of the early morning shift thrust upon me. Heck. Had a shave (hige-o-suru), got 2 cuts, unfortunately. New stuff going on: C- san has arrived, another English! I'll have to lend her some newspapers in exchange for a Japanese book.
Mebs practise some flashcards too.
biiru sake orange jus & Oolong tea -
Yuki desu ne!
Plus, missed breakfast a 2nd time. -_-
So I'd best try & catch C- 2moz. - she is also wanting to go to SOAS - so could be fun to get to know her - secure a friend before I go lol!!
Im reluctant to sleep as that means work in the morning, ah well.
K- is on the biiru tonite.
And (!!!) met a Mongolian girl tonite in work who was good fun. I learned the name of L- - who is tall & Chinese. Sh*t, g'nite. Oyasumi.
20th,Wasnt too bad, quite short, but had to do an 'introduction' and Im still doin afternoon too so =S
21st, Was fun in the end, got talkin guitars and just did a band jam sort of thing. Didn't have a clue what to play so did some random stuff and Welcome Home! wo0p!
Also been trying to learn more Japanese with mild success.
A-, Korean girl, very friendly and tries to talk to me as well as Mongolian girl who is older than me! Damnit!
Did catch C- a lil bit and new Holiday! For two days so better chance now. Need something to do..... Lunch!
22nd, Mint Party for leaving ppland R- san's birthday. T- got pretty bad with a sleeping pill lol but amazingly I was fine this morning!
And even better, I think my Japanese is slowly getting better. Went to U- after having a snowball fight to see off the korean (A- - hot chick) & japanese. U- with NM-san, T-san and M- was good fun, shopping etc. Later we went to see the koreans who were good fun, spoke about girls etc. lol.
Learned a bit more, all fun!!
T- 's English is going very well too, I'm impressed and enjoy helping him =). funfun 23rd, work today, mebs Ill see the Australien guy.
Still haven't
25th, been couple days of fun, AI. san is leaving so we partied and it was I- san's biday last nite. No party but went round to C-'s and helped M- benkyo English. been learning from book i lent. Need to Email yem. been teaching slang whey!
Rang G'ma & uncle today
Really starting to enjoy self, work is easy and making friends is fun. Contact lenses came & broke =| ah well. Happy happy happy. (non-sarcastic this time)
26th, Rainy Day Woman - Bob Dylan. (leaving party)
3rd, bored lol - many parties & fun and loads of work too =| but got to use the pc & shizz. T- went to Tokyo& modorimashita. so extra partying, B- is fun & good at Japanese, I got lessons of him, M- , L- & J-, etc. i.e. no Japanese people except T-. lol. s'all good though, gonna go see if owt's goin on cos I'm bored of listenin to the same CD.
8th/9th Back to Tokyo at 3pm today/// Been drinking with just me と T (谷) which was fun, Cool photos. Today there was a beautiful girl hosting 'ju-ban' and we started talking but i doubt I'll see her again. She was like a Japanese CMc. =D
Can't believe U-san is so old yet looks so pretty ah well. Today work was canny. Last few days have been fun hanging with AK a lot & going to the class. This morning we went to th P- hotel (open again!) I found a caterpillar & also M- was looking very pretty today as it was her yasumi. In Tokyo i need to buy some cheap biiru & noodles. I think I'll buy a CD too, such as 'Gocco' whose voice is gorgeous.
K- has been fun to hang with too & we're fast at working together. The other day we watched a drama & I learned quite a lot. S'all good. I also need a good moisturiser. (itchy skin)
Kuta san brought us chocolate & beer! We had a party for J---n who's leaving soon & the coke machine broke but is back in action. wo0p! Also, tonight miK-san [said] 'Big bitch' but he says it wrong =P & gimpy too. I oughta send [bank] a letter too.
naK-san is fun as-per-usual & life is generally good (altho I wonder when ill next feel homesick. Ah well, I need somebody to love. o-yasumi!!!
21st, naK-san left today,
-kinda goin crazy (MNUC)
-lalala-
-saranhe
23rd, Sudden bout of depression. U- was depressed cos naK left. I just think I shouldn't like M- so much since she's leaving very soon. But she's great... ah well.
Christmas not at hyem is the strangest thing which half explains the kanashii... also a kind of rejection off M- possibly. I dunno mebs not. who cares really?
BK- can be fun & BD- (like me?) too, but well, its strange
Its gonna be rubbish w/out Mana.
Snowboarding has been great! Arrgh I'm so depressed. I want to cr like i did the other day. Sent the postcard... need to get S-'s postcode somehow...
Cant believe I did that...
bought a new earring you know. been listening to NOFX lately... need to borrow M-'s hip-hop CD cause some of those tracks are awesome.
Working on christmas eve =/ but not day like C- which is lucky.
='/
how do you work a relationship if A) you dunno if there is one and B) can barely speak the same language.. & shit. lol ive managed to soak T- no futon - daijobu. talked as fun & etc. benkyou
31, Sim sim him b'day du quee (learned)
Damnit 'late' this morning, plus no common room damn place.
Busy week is a bit shit. & listenin to Mongol hip hop when M- is leaving isnt huge fun & T-'s disappeared somewhere. Very high snow.
horhun chi ni
ah well
mid winter depression blues
interesting last few weeks
new korean girl taken liking to vice versa, AK & viets & ko-san & wood-san all gone. Been hangin with BK who broke his arm lol =/ and is therefore leaving in 10 days.
Own room now, kinda weird, but ramen good. Work usually ok but stressed today due to big party, but ok anyway.
Yukikaki damnit, ok sounds like kettles boilin... ttfn
Today the drinking spree ended -phew! I've had a new roommate, got a girlfriend i'm unsure about and neglected nihongo no benkyo entirely., feeling kinda sad but I dont know why, Homesick maybe. I need communication but here its not entirely satisfying. So here starts the re-benkyo... Just for the record me, miK & R-chan have been having fun together lately. underlined 人 especially.
Interesting day, chotto trouble 今 about miso & shizz, but its not awful I guess.
Big bad meeting and really missing home, coast to coast dates sorted out but unfort. clash with Spain date.... hmmm...
so I think I'll sleep
こまくさ ashita dakara...
Damnit. Tequilla really is a dangerous drink...
been a pretty awful last few days and now stuck on some sort of probation...
Its turned out OK, I don't feel half as f*cked up after a small safe party @ Ariatomo san の heya. Niters.
"If you really dont like the idea of people talking while they work, why don't you come round my room & suck my dick?"
Oh, that seems to include most of Japan... Happy time for me!
Yeah yesterday was canny annoying... today has started alrite... too bad BK- leaves tomorrow. At least we'll get a party tho. TBH tho, Ive quite enjoyed myself lately except for being ill. Another insult I thought of was
"Why dont you (turn gay),
go to a gay bar,
& get raped?"
But OK, thts enough of that sorta stuff. laters dude.
anyway now ive left M- hotel, been fun watching prison break, not too sad to leave & now just rang/got a call of U- & C-. sounds fun. Meet up is imminent lol!! wo0p.
Part 1 - went to japan, got a job at M- Hotel, onsen and ski-slope hotel, on a mountain. so it begins.
Part 2
16th, got back to M- Hotel and drank 3 cans that night. awoke with a headache.. uncle, auntie and g'ma came up.
met interesting auzzie (possible reggae party in february)
17th, Started first day of work - was canny as K- san (in charge of me) spoke English. Some nice ladies here... - sleepy so missed breakfast again.
19th, I sit... lie in bed, the prospect of the early morning shift thrust upon me. Heck. Had a shave (hige-o-suru), got 2 cuts, unfortunately. New stuff going on: C- san has arrived, another English! I'll have to lend her some newspapers in exchange for a Japanese book.
Mebs practise some flashcards too.
biiru sake orange jus & Oolong tea -
Yuki desu ne!
Plus, missed breakfast a 2nd time. -_-
So I'd best try & catch C- 2moz. - she is also wanting to go to SOAS - so could be fun to get to know her - secure a friend before I go lol!!
Im reluctant to sleep as that means work in the morning, ah well.
K- is on the biiru tonite.
And (!!!) met a Mongolian girl tonite in work who was good fun. I learned the name of L- - who is tall & Chinese. Sh*t, g'nite. Oyasumi.
20th,Wasnt too bad, quite short, but had to do an 'introduction' and Im still doin afternoon too so =S
21st, Was fun in the end, got talkin guitars and just did a band jam sort of thing. Didn't have a clue what to play so did some random stuff and Welcome Home! wo0p!
Also been trying to learn more Japanese with mild success.
A-, Korean girl, very friendly and tries to talk to me as well as Mongolian girl who is older than me! Damnit!
Did catch C- a lil bit and new Holiday! For two days so better chance now. Need something to do..... Lunch!
22nd, Mint Party for leaving ppland R- san's birthday. T- got pretty bad with a sleeping pill lol but amazingly I was fine this morning!
And even better, I think my Japanese is slowly getting better. Went to U- after having a snowball fight to see off the korean (A- - hot chick) & japanese. U- with NM-san, T-san and M- was good fun, shopping etc. Later we went to see the koreans who were good fun, spoke about girls etc. lol.
Learned a bit more, all fun!!
T- 's English is going very well too, I'm impressed and enjoy helping him =). funfun 23rd, work today, mebs Ill see the Australien guy.
Still haven't
25th, been couple days of fun, AI. san is leaving so we partied and it was I- san's biday last nite. No party but went round to C-'s and helped M- benkyo English. been learning from book i lent. Need to Email yem. been teaching slang whey!
Rang G'ma & uncle today
Really starting to enjoy self, work is easy and making friends is fun. Contact lenses came & broke =| ah well. Happy happy happy. (non-sarcastic this time)
26th, Rainy Day Woman - Bob Dylan. (leaving party)
3rd, bored lol - many parties & fun and loads of work too =| but got to use the pc & shizz. T- went to Tokyo& modorimashita. so extra partying, B- is fun & good at Japanese, I got lessons of him, M- , L- & J-, etc. i.e. no Japanese people except T-. lol. s'all good though, gonna go see if owt's goin on cos I'm bored of listenin to the same CD.
8th/9th Back to Tokyo at 3pm today/// Been drinking with just me と T (谷) which was fun, Cool photos. Today there was a beautiful girl hosting 'ju-ban' and we started talking but i doubt I'll see her again. She was like a Japanese CMc. =D
Can't believe U-san is so old yet looks so pretty ah well. Today work was canny. Last few days have been fun hanging with AK a lot & going to the class. This morning we went to th P- hotel (open again!) I found a caterpillar & also M- was looking very pretty today as it was her yasumi. In Tokyo i need to buy some cheap biiru & noodles. I think I'll buy a CD too, such as 'Gocco' whose voice is gorgeous.
K- has been fun to hang with too & we're fast at working together. The other day we watched a drama & I learned quite a lot. S'all good. I also need a good moisturiser. (itchy skin)
Kuta san brought us chocolate & beer! We had a party for J---n who's leaving soon & the coke machine broke but is back in action. wo0p! Also, tonight miK-san [said] 'Big bitch' but he says it wrong =P & gimpy too. I oughta send [bank] a letter too.
naK-san is fun as-per-usual & life is generally good (altho I wonder when ill next feel homesick. Ah well, I need somebody to love. o-yasumi!!!
21st, naK-san left today,
-kinda goin crazy (MNUC)
-lalala-
-saranhe
23rd, Sudden bout of depression. U- was depressed cos naK left. I just think I shouldn't like M- so much since she's leaving very soon. But she's great... ah well.
Christmas not at hyem is the strangest thing which half explains the kanashii... also a kind of rejection off M- possibly. I dunno mebs not. who cares really?
BK- can be fun & BD- (like me?) too, but well, its strange
Its gonna be rubbish w/out Mana.
Snowboarding has been great! Arrgh I'm so depressed. I want to cr like i did the other day. Sent the postcard... need to get S-'s postcode somehow...
Cant believe I did that...
bought a new earring you know. been listening to NOFX lately... need to borrow M-'s hip-hop CD cause some of those tracks are awesome.
Working on christmas eve =/ but not day like C- which is lucky.
='/
how do you work a relationship if A) you dunno if there is one and B) can barely speak the same language.. & shit. lol ive managed to soak T- no futon - daijobu. talked as fun & etc. benkyou
31, Sim sim him b'day du quee (learned)
Damnit 'late' this morning, plus no common room damn place.
Busy week is a bit shit. & listenin to Mongol hip hop when M- is leaving isnt huge fun & T-'s disappeared somewhere. Very high snow.
horhun chi ni
ah well
mid winter depression blues
interesting last few weeks
new korean girl taken liking to vice versa, AK & viets & ko-san & wood-san all gone. Been hangin with BK who broke his arm lol =/ and is therefore leaving in 10 days.
Own room now, kinda weird, but ramen good. Work usually ok but stressed today due to big party, but ok anyway.
Yukikaki damnit, ok sounds like kettles boilin... ttfn
Today the drinking spree ended -phew! I've had a new roommate, got a girlfriend i'm unsure about and neglected nihongo no benkyo entirely., feeling kinda sad but I dont know why, Homesick maybe. I need communication but here its not entirely satisfying. So here starts the re-benkyo... Just for the record me, miK & R-chan have been having fun together lately. underlined 人 especially.
Interesting day, chotto trouble 今 about miso & shizz, but its not awful I guess.
Big bad meeting and really missing home, coast to coast dates sorted out but unfort. clash with Spain date.... hmmm...
so I think I'll sleep
こまくさ ashita dakara...
Damnit. Tequilla really is a dangerous drink...
been a pretty awful last few days and now stuck on some sort of probation...
Its turned out OK, I don't feel half as f*cked up after a small safe party @ Ariatomo san の heya. Niters.
"If you really dont like the idea of people talking while they work, why don't you come round my room & suck my dick?"
Oh, that seems to include most of Japan... Happy time for me!
Yeah yesterday was canny annoying... today has started alrite... too bad BK- leaves tomorrow. At least we'll get a party tho. TBH tho, Ive quite enjoyed myself lately except for being ill. Another insult I thought of was
"Why dont you (turn gay),
go to a gay bar,
& get raped?"
But OK, thts enough of that sorta stuff. laters dude.
anyway now ive left M- hotel, been fun watching prison break, not too sad to leave & now just rang/got a call of U- & C-. sounds fun. Meet up is imminent lol!! wo0p.
Friday 26 March 2010
Consider (i) the constituent elements, (ii) the underlying economic logic and (iii) the economic implications of land reform and the `new technology' introduced in agriculture in poor countries since the mid-1960s.
Consider (i) the constituent elements, (ii) the underlying economic logic and (iii) the economic implications of land reform and the `new technology' introduced in agriculture in poor countries since the mid-1960s.
In LDCs agriculture accounts for 40-90 percent of total output and between 40-80 percent of employment[1] (Ghatak, 1998). In partnership with industrialisation, development of agriculture is important for increasing living standards in developing countries. Its role includes; transfer of labour to the growing industrial sector, the supply of a highly demanded/necessary major wage good (food), a main source of raw materials to export for the gain of foreign exchange.
If farmers are assumed to want to maximise profits, then the increase in production by the use of new technology (which should lead to a lower unit cost of production) will bring about a lower total cost at a greater output and when this higher output is sold then “New technology raises the net income or profit of farmers” (Ghatak, 1998). Furthermore for a small farmer, if the demand for food is price elastic (i.e. sensitivity of demand to the price of food is high) then as his crop production goes up so will his total revenue. With the increase in supply (due to new technology) the price per crop will drop and the farmer will need to increase his production to keep his total revenue. If he does not adopt the new technologies then his costs will stay the same and “he will experience a fall in net income” (Ghatak, 1998). For larger farmers it is easier to increase the inputs and therefore increase or at least match profit. If price elasticity is inelastic then, as the price is lowered by an increase in supply from farmers using new technologies, if he does not increase his inputs and increase supply then his profits will fall. The larger farmers who can afford the increase in inputs are much less affected (Ghatak, 1998). This will occur until equilibrium between supply and demand is found. It is by this logic that, improved technology will bring desired (probably higher) agricultural productivity in developing countries and thus farmers, in order to maximise their profits, will adopt the new technologies, and those who do not will lose their farm to larger farms as they fail to cover costs with revenue. In this way output should be maximised. However, when studied further it does not appear to occur this way due to a number of factors.
This dominance of agriculture comes with a variety of different types of farmers. These include large land holders, landless peasants, subsistence peasants and sharecropping peasants. The landless labourers often were ex-landholding peasants who, as plots were divided up into smaller pieces eventually sold their land to larger local landlords and were forced to take up very low paid job on the farms or plantations. The subsistence peasants and sharecropping peasants are those who fall into ‘debt bondage’ instead of selling land, taking credit at ‘extortionate’ interest rates and being trapped into giving part of their crops per year[2] as interest (Sloman, 2006). Considering this was being documented 2006, almost 40 years after the start of the ‘Green Revolution’, with its pursuers’ promise of alleviating rural poverty[3], one must ask just what affect it has had for developing countries.
The Green Revolution (i.e. ‘New technology’) is defined as a significant increase in crop production per acre for equal inputs after the modern technology and technique has been adopted, see graph 1 (Ghatak, 1998). Land Reform (or also, agrarian reform) is the redistribution of land with the aim of increasing agricultural production (Munck, 1984). It has been suggested that the Green Revolution could act as a replacement for land reform, which is often politically difficult to implement, but it can be argued that they are only complimentary and one without the other will not have the effect of alleviating poverty and can only partially help the country’s development. There is higher productivity of labour in the rest of the economy compared to that of agriculture for developing countries, in 1980, 15 years on from the start of the Green Revolution. When Griffin says that “low productivity in agriculture will be associated with low rural incomes and a high incidence of poverty” (Griffin, 1991) he is saying that by 1980 and yet now, the Green Revolution has not delivered upon its promise to alleviate poverty.
In the application of Land Reform there are two central objectives: “greater agricultural production and more social justice” (Cohen, 1978). One reason why production has to be increased is the population growth – required greater production as land expansion could not be expected to meet increased food demands as time went on. In order to meet this increasing demand, the expansion of land used has been a large supply of the growth of agricultural output. However, such expansion cannot be guaranteed as potential land becomes sparser. Thus the land already available had to increase in productivity. One way of achieving this was connected to the size of farms and their productivity.
In general, it would be assumed that larger farms could take advantage of greater economies of scale, using productive farm resources more efficiently than smaller farms. However, it has been noted that there is an inverse link between the size of farms and productivity in developing countries. In other words, it appears that smaller farms tend to have higher production: such as the difference between latifundia and minifundia and smaller family farm levels of output[4] (Todaro, 1985). This may be through poorer farmers who own less land cropping more intensively, harvesting one extra crop per year than larger farmers with higher income. Reason for this is the survival incentive[5]. What this difference indicates is an inefficient allocation of resources, actual output lower than potential output and an unequal distribution of income (Griffin, 1991). Radical land reforms are required to address the effects of the inefficiency of larger farms on the economy (Ghatak, 1998).
Although smaller farms are said to be more efficient than the very larger ones, there is a floor to this rule, seen in Latin America, where in fact the product of the family farms is more than the minifundia, as well as elsewhere[6]. A second part to the land reform objective of increased productivity of agriculture is to increase investment into the land. In order to increase investment, some property rights must be changed. Quite often in developing countries, the (sometimes absentee) landlord, in order to “minimise risk”[7], fragments his land, and rents it out in very small plots, often for short time periods and (in the case of sharecropping) having pre-arranged contracts at high costs to the tenants. This fragmentation makes it harder to access and irrigate, which, as will be discussed, is extremely important when considering the green revolution (Ghatak, 1998). Removing absentee landlords and distributing the land to the tenants is a suggested remedy, the logic being that absentee landlords do not have an interest in investing to increase the productivity of their land[8]. If the tenant’s rental period were to be increased by law, then investment would be less of a risk. This is especially so because agricultural investment tends to have gains in the long-run. Even if the peasants did want to invest, if he does not own the land, he would require a loan from the informal sector, at massive interest. All these problems magnify the unlikelihood of a poor farmer adopting the ‘New Technology’ that’s required to increase the productivity of the land, and thus achieve desirable agricultural growth.
Despite these theoretical benefits, although Land Reform has benefitted some developing countries on their path to increasing agricultural output and in developing altogether, these cases must be carefully considered and are relatively few. The biggest successes were those of South Korean and Taiwanese land reform. However, this can be put down to specificities of the time[9] (Griffin, 1991). In comparison, in India, poor peasants and landless labourers gained very little from the land reform (Ben Crow, 1988). Sometimes where land reform was appearing to work, its effectiveness was affected greatly by political implications of the times (sometimes brought about by the reforms) as seen in the example of Chile[10] (Munck, 1984). Then again, there is evidence of land reform working to reduce the inequality, with Gini index reducing from between 6 percent (Columbia and India) and about 27 percent (Mexico and Taiwan) (Cohen, 1978). What may be suggested is that even if there is some form of land reform promised, it is only through complementary institution change, such as farmer co-operatives and state backed credit for smaller farmers that real change could be achieved[11], paving the way for cash-cropping farmers. Also required for this is structural investment, in the form of transport and power (electricity) to help sell the marketable surplus (Griffin, 1991). However, reform seems to tend to benefit mainly the rich peasants and landlords, being unequal due to the inability of states/governments to enforce rules as effectively as necessary (Hans P.Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009).
On top of this it seems likely that as the survival incentive that increased the output per hectare is removed[12] then the previously affected farmers are more likely to crop one less harvest per year, similar to the richer farmer’s patterns (Ben Crow, 1988). If this is the case then it is possible that the increased output of small farms is simply an indicator of poverty. This would mean that, hand in hand with ‘New Technology’, as the availability of new technical inputs becomes available via the Green Revolution, then the greatest beneficiaries would be those who become large cash cropping[13] farmers (although the shift to cash cropping is not an immediate one) as are seen in developed countries. The political will to introduce land reform is also hampered by immediate costs to production, which could cause chaos, even if, in terms of agricultural output, evidence points to a “very strong capacity for rapid and continuous growth” afterwards (Cohen, 1978). Thus, while in theory, land reform is almost essential for successful adoption of ‘New technology’, it is exceptionally difficult to administer the changes and the application of ‘New Technology’ must be considered with or without it.
Considering the difficulty of land reform, there were some points that made the adoption of ‘New Technology’ desirable. There were two types of technology, the labour intensive biological: High Yield Variety seeds[14], pesticides and fertilisers, and the capital intensive mechanical: tractors, threshers etc. Firstly, it was expected that certain technologies, that is the biological technology, were ‘scale neutral’. According to Azam, “relatively more severe constraints on irrigation water and credit [for smaller farmers] are not serious enough to have caused any significant differences in yields by small farmers as compared with large farmers” (Azam 1973)[15]. This would mean that, without land reform, adaption of biological new technology could be useful for the development of agriculture in developing countries. The application of these technologies alone should lead to a higher yield per hectare. However, as these technologies were implemented, it became obvious that certain mechanical, capital intensive and labour displacing technologies would be required. This was because, with higher yields in shorter times, it would become far easier to collect the crop in time with the mechanical improvements, than be labour intensive. Also, because the labour had more bargaining power, being in higher demand, the adoption of these tractors, combined harvesters, etc. would help farmers avoid struggles with the stronger labour force. This labour displacing creates unemployment and is not productive for development if it is not absorbed by an industrialised sector[16]. On top of this the adoption of these technologies would end up increasing regional inequality.
In Mexico the green revolution, at first, until the 70s, brought about satisfactory growth through state investment in irrigation and the quick adoption of HYV seeds however this growth soon fizzled out as irrigation and the technical transformation was not transferred to other regions (Griffin, 1991). In India, the lack of irrigation in some regions compared to others demonstrates the limitations of the Green Revolution for developing countries, where irrigated land is often low (such as 25 percent in India by 1975). Partial use of the inputs due to “too little income to buy adequate agricultural machinery, fertilisers or pesticides" (Sloman, 2006), meant that productivity was not fully increased. If you also consider that agricultural land is not homogenous, but differences come between highlands and lowlands, rain-fed and irrigated, crop and ranching (Griffin, 1991), not just throughout the world, but within regions, then it becomes obvious that such inequality is inevitable. Inequality was also accentuated by the types of HYV seeds which were available. Since wheat and rice, the main HYV seeds available were superior foods and not the staple crop they were therefore more expensive, it would require their prices to fall for benefits to accrue to the poor. However the prices did not fall and the growth of other inferior food grains fell or even became negative as farmers switched to the more lucrative HYV seeds, thus leaving the rural and urban poor worse off, as more of their income would have to go towards paying higher prices for food (Ghatak, 1998).
At a glance it seems that the New Technology adopted and Land Reforms that have occurred have been successful, when growth of output increased 25 percent from the 60s to the mid 80s[17]. However, remove China from the calculation and the performance seems much less impressive (Griffin, 1991). Including China average growth per head in Griffin’s example of 20 countries is 1.08 percent, but when China is excluded this falls dramatically to 0.49 percent. In fact, in Africa many countries have experienced agricultural decline (although the Cote d’Ivoire is an encouraging counter-example). In the 80s food grain production increased in countries which, relatively effectively, adopted new technologies (from 128 million tons in 1978-9 to 151.6 million tons in 1983-4) and of these countries India has become an exporter of rice to the world market (Ghatak, 1998). However, this does not mean that the production has been maximised (if it can be). While peasant farmers are seen to aim for maximisation when given the full chance (Ghatak, 1998) it is required that the state make sure enough insurance and credit is available to induce participation of the poorest farmers. (Todaro, 1985) However, the limited outreach of the state leads to misuses of the improvements offered. For example, in India tax evasion was high, the state subsidised credit was taken by rich peasants and landlords and then sold on at higher interest rates to the poorer farmers, and the lobbying of the rich peasants helped to keep food prices high (at the expense of the poor) (Ben Crow, 1988). Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, overall agricultural productivity in all but rice crops fell, and in South America productivity fell.
In conclusion, while there are examples of countries where land reform and ‘New Technologies’ were adapted successfully[18] and development all in all was enhanced by these, there are far more examples where there was ‘New technology’ adapted with partial land reform, or almost none. This has not often brought about desirable results in alleviating poverty and increasing rural standards of living and bringing about improved development throughout the economy, as a strong political will is important to help implement co-operative and credit schemes for poor and landless peasants. Plus, the hope of only using labour intensive biological New Technologies has been quashed and thus the capital intensive, inappropriate technologies have to be adopted if the improved agricultural production is to be continued. However, there are still hopes of improving living standards through new technologies. ‘GM crops[19]’ are new improved seeds being developed, which require less herbicide and pesticide and are less harmful to the farmers’ health and are still higher yielding[20] and which are being developed my research partnerships in developed countries and developing countries[21]. However, these are being hampered by anti-GM sentiment in large demand countries Japan and throughout Europe[22]. The hope is that this may change in the future, as the gains of GM crops are realised (Paarlberg, 2002). Another hopeful development has been the recent land reform policies in Brazil. Since the mid-1990s "land reform on a massive scale [was] improved", for example in the state of Ceará where poor families obtained financing for purchasing agricultural properties[23] although this was encouraged by falling land prices at the time. Although this land reform seems promising its development should be monitored with caution. (Hans P.Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009)
[1] There are great differences between countries in Africa and Asia, where employment in agriculture is dominant, as compared to Latin America where employment in agriculture is, on average, less dominant. (Griffin, 1991)
[2] Often between 50-80 percent (Todaro, 1985)
[3] (Ghatak, 1998)
[4] Where in Argentina, Brazil and Chile minifundia yield more than twice as much as latifundia, and “the latifundia in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Chile and Guatemala are all below… the medium-sized family farms as well”.
[5] Or attempting to make enough money to pay off high interest debts to landlords and/or informal money lenders.
[6] "Poor continued to hold small patches of land that were insufficient even for subsistence farming." (Hans P.Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009)
[7] Or/and maximise rent pay.
[8] As they are satisfied in their income from rents.
[9] Taiwan: under threat of Communism from the mainland and ‘not dependent upon the political support of Taiwanese landowners’, and South Korea: urgency brought about by the Korean War and presented as ‘removing the vestiges of Japanese colonialism’.
[10] In Chile – agrarian reform led to reducing in latifundia but after 1973 coup wheat production fell to that of the 1920s, ‘when population was half of what it was today’, as state economic support to small land holders declined.
[11] In order to convince farmers unwilling to join the market with new technologies due to the risk of a ‘bad year’ when they have tried and tested ways of definitely feeding family. (Todaro, 1985)
[12] By state backed insurance or credit-lending
[13] Crops grown specifically to be sold on the (world) market.
[14] i.e. HYV seeds
[15] via (Ghatak, 1998)
[16] Labour can’t entirely be absorbed at least In the short run even if it is demanded due to the lack of structural mobility of labour, which will have undesirable effects as unemployed become dependents
[17] Somewhat explained by population expansion slowing from its 1970 peak of 2.6 per year to 2 percent per year.
[18] South Korean, Taiwan which were discussed earlier
[19] Genetically Modified crops
[20] Examples are the Bt cotton variety.
[21] Thus are more likely to be suited for developing countries needs, hopefully including more staple foods such as pulses. Also public initiatives such as HarvestPlus, that seeks to reduce micronutrient malnutrition to breed nutrient-dense staple foods (http://www.harvestplus.org).
[22] Then again, if these were going to be exported, perhaps the increased yield would not actually accrue to an improvement for the poor in the countries, unless subsidised by the state
[23] 15,200 families settled on 609 separate properties at a cost of approximately $3000 per family.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ben Crow, M. T. (1988). Survival and Change in the Third World. Norwich: Page Bros Ltd.
Cohen, S. (1978). Agrarian structures and agrarian reform. Leiden|Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Social Sciences Division.
Currie, J. (1981). The Economic Theory of Agricultural Land Tenure. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
Ghatak, S. (1998). Introduction to Development Economics (3rd Edition ed.). Padstow, Cornwall: T.J. International Ltd.
Griffin, K. (1991). Alternative Strategies for Economic Development (91 reprint ed.). Hong Kong: MACMILLAN ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL LTD.
Hans P.Binswanger-Mkhize, C. B. (2009). Agricultural Land Redistribution, Towards Greater Consensus. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Munck, R. (1984). Politics and Dependancy in the Third World; The Case of Latin America. London: Zed Books Ltd.
Paarlberg, J. I. (2002, October 4). Explaining restricted approval and availability of GM cropsin developing countries. Retrieved 3 23, 2010, from http://joelcohen.org: http://joelcohen.org/pdf/RestrictedApproval.pdf
Sloman, J. (2006). Economics (6th Edition ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
Terence K Hopkins, I. W. (1998). The Age of Transition, Trajectory of the World-System, 1945-2025. London: Zed Books.
Todaro, M. P. (1985). Economic Development in the Third World (3rd ed.). New York: Longman, Inc.
In LDCs agriculture accounts for 40-90 percent of total output and between 40-80 percent of employment[1] (Ghatak, 1998). In partnership with industrialisation, development of agriculture is important for increasing living standards in developing countries. Its role includes; transfer of labour to the growing industrial sector, the supply of a highly demanded/necessary major wage good (food), a main source of raw materials to export for the gain of foreign exchange.
If farmers are assumed to want to maximise profits, then the increase in production by the use of new technology (which should lead to a lower unit cost of production) will bring about a lower total cost at a greater output and when this higher output is sold then “New technology raises the net income or profit of farmers” (Ghatak, 1998). Furthermore for a small farmer, if the demand for food is price elastic (i.e. sensitivity of demand to the price of food is high) then as his crop production goes up so will his total revenue. With the increase in supply (due to new technology) the price per crop will drop and the farmer will need to increase his production to keep his total revenue. If he does not adopt the new technologies then his costs will stay the same and “he will experience a fall in net income” (Ghatak, 1998). For larger farmers it is easier to increase the inputs and therefore increase or at least match profit. If price elasticity is inelastic then, as the price is lowered by an increase in supply from farmers using new technologies, if he does not increase his inputs and increase supply then his profits will fall. The larger farmers who can afford the increase in inputs are much less affected (Ghatak, 1998). This will occur until equilibrium between supply and demand is found. It is by this logic that, improved technology will bring desired (probably higher) agricultural productivity in developing countries and thus farmers, in order to maximise their profits, will adopt the new technologies, and those who do not will lose their farm to larger farms as they fail to cover costs with revenue. In this way output should be maximised. However, when studied further it does not appear to occur this way due to a number of factors.
This dominance of agriculture comes with a variety of different types of farmers. These include large land holders, landless peasants, subsistence peasants and sharecropping peasants. The landless labourers often were ex-landholding peasants who, as plots were divided up into smaller pieces eventually sold their land to larger local landlords and were forced to take up very low paid job on the farms or plantations. The subsistence peasants and sharecropping peasants are those who fall into ‘debt bondage’ instead of selling land, taking credit at ‘extortionate’ interest rates and being trapped into giving part of their crops per year[2] as interest (Sloman, 2006). Considering this was being documented 2006, almost 40 years after the start of the ‘Green Revolution’, with its pursuers’ promise of alleviating rural poverty[3], one must ask just what affect it has had for developing countries.
The Green Revolution (i.e. ‘New technology’) is defined as a significant increase in crop production per acre for equal inputs after the modern technology and technique has been adopted, see graph 1 (Ghatak, 1998). Land Reform (or also, agrarian reform) is the redistribution of land with the aim of increasing agricultural production (Munck, 1984). It has been suggested that the Green Revolution could act as a replacement for land reform, which is often politically difficult to implement, but it can be argued that they are only complimentary and one without the other will not have the effect of alleviating poverty and can only partially help the country’s development. There is higher productivity of labour in the rest of the economy compared to that of agriculture for developing countries, in 1980, 15 years on from the start of the Green Revolution. When Griffin says that “low productivity in agriculture will be associated with low rural incomes and a high incidence of poverty” (Griffin, 1991) he is saying that by 1980 and yet now, the Green Revolution has not delivered upon its promise to alleviate poverty.
In the application of Land Reform there are two central objectives: “greater agricultural production and more social justice” (Cohen, 1978). One reason why production has to be increased is the population growth – required greater production as land expansion could not be expected to meet increased food demands as time went on. In order to meet this increasing demand, the expansion of land used has been a large supply of the growth of agricultural output. However, such expansion cannot be guaranteed as potential land becomes sparser. Thus the land already available had to increase in productivity. One way of achieving this was connected to the size of farms and their productivity.
In general, it would be assumed that larger farms could take advantage of greater economies of scale, using productive farm resources more efficiently than smaller farms. However, it has been noted that there is an inverse link between the size of farms and productivity in developing countries. In other words, it appears that smaller farms tend to have higher production: such as the difference between latifundia and minifundia and smaller family farm levels of output[4] (Todaro, 1985). This may be through poorer farmers who own less land cropping more intensively, harvesting one extra crop per year than larger farmers with higher income. Reason for this is the survival incentive[5]. What this difference indicates is an inefficient allocation of resources, actual output lower than potential output and an unequal distribution of income (Griffin, 1991). Radical land reforms are required to address the effects of the inefficiency of larger farms on the economy (Ghatak, 1998).
Although smaller farms are said to be more efficient than the very larger ones, there is a floor to this rule, seen in Latin America, where in fact the product of the family farms is more than the minifundia, as well as elsewhere[6]. A second part to the land reform objective of increased productivity of agriculture is to increase investment into the land. In order to increase investment, some property rights must be changed. Quite often in developing countries, the (sometimes absentee) landlord, in order to “minimise risk”[7], fragments his land, and rents it out in very small plots, often for short time periods and (in the case of sharecropping) having pre-arranged contracts at high costs to the tenants. This fragmentation makes it harder to access and irrigate, which, as will be discussed, is extremely important when considering the green revolution (Ghatak, 1998). Removing absentee landlords and distributing the land to the tenants is a suggested remedy, the logic being that absentee landlords do not have an interest in investing to increase the productivity of their land[8]. If the tenant’s rental period were to be increased by law, then investment would be less of a risk. This is especially so because agricultural investment tends to have gains in the long-run. Even if the peasants did want to invest, if he does not own the land, he would require a loan from the informal sector, at massive interest. All these problems magnify the unlikelihood of a poor farmer adopting the ‘New Technology’ that’s required to increase the productivity of the land, and thus achieve desirable agricultural growth.
Despite these theoretical benefits, although Land Reform has benefitted some developing countries on their path to increasing agricultural output and in developing altogether, these cases must be carefully considered and are relatively few. The biggest successes were those of South Korean and Taiwanese land reform. However, this can be put down to specificities of the time[9] (Griffin, 1991). In comparison, in India, poor peasants and landless labourers gained very little from the land reform (Ben Crow, 1988). Sometimes where land reform was appearing to work, its effectiveness was affected greatly by political implications of the times (sometimes brought about by the reforms) as seen in the example of Chile[10] (Munck, 1984). Then again, there is evidence of land reform working to reduce the inequality, with Gini index reducing from between 6 percent (Columbia and India) and about 27 percent (Mexico and Taiwan) (Cohen, 1978). What may be suggested is that even if there is some form of land reform promised, it is only through complementary institution change, such as farmer co-operatives and state backed credit for smaller farmers that real change could be achieved[11], paving the way for cash-cropping farmers. Also required for this is structural investment, in the form of transport and power (electricity) to help sell the marketable surplus (Griffin, 1991). However, reform seems to tend to benefit mainly the rich peasants and landlords, being unequal due to the inability of states/governments to enforce rules as effectively as necessary (Hans P.Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009).
On top of this it seems likely that as the survival incentive that increased the output per hectare is removed[12] then the previously affected farmers are more likely to crop one less harvest per year, similar to the richer farmer’s patterns (Ben Crow, 1988). If this is the case then it is possible that the increased output of small farms is simply an indicator of poverty. This would mean that, hand in hand with ‘New Technology’, as the availability of new technical inputs becomes available via the Green Revolution, then the greatest beneficiaries would be those who become large cash cropping[13] farmers (although the shift to cash cropping is not an immediate one) as are seen in developed countries. The political will to introduce land reform is also hampered by immediate costs to production, which could cause chaos, even if, in terms of agricultural output, evidence points to a “very strong capacity for rapid and continuous growth” afterwards (Cohen, 1978). Thus, while in theory, land reform is almost essential for successful adoption of ‘New technology’, it is exceptionally difficult to administer the changes and the application of ‘New Technology’ must be considered with or without it.
Considering the difficulty of land reform, there were some points that made the adoption of ‘New Technology’ desirable. There were two types of technology, the labour intensive biological: High Yield Variety seeds[14], pesticides and fertilisers, and the capital intensive mechanical: tractors, threshers etc. Firstly, it was expected that certain technologies, that is the biological technology, were ‘scale neutral’. According to Azam, “relatively more severe constraints on irrigation water and credit [for smaller farmers] are not serious enough to have caused any significant differences in yields by small farmers as compared with large farmers” (Azam 1973)[15]. This would mean that, without land reform, adaption of biological new technology could be useful for the development of agriculture in developing countries. The application of these technologies alone should lead to a higher yield per hectare. However, as these technologies were implemented, it became obvious that certain mechanical, capital intensive and labour displacing technologies would be required. This was because, with higher yields in shorter times, it would become far easier to collect the crop in time with the mechanical improvements, than be labour intensive. Also, because the labour had more bargaining power, being in higher demand, the adoption of these tractors, combined harvesters, etc. would help farmers avoid struggles with the stronger labour force. This labour displacing creates unemployment and is not productive for development if it is not absorbed by an industrialised sector[16]. On top of this the adoption of these technologies would end up increasing regional inequality.
In Mexico the green revolution, at first, until the 70s, brought about satisfactory growth through state investment in irrigation and the quick adoption of HYV seeds however this growth soon fizzled out as irrigation and the technical transformation was not transferred to other regions (Griffin, 1991). In India, the lack of irrigation in some regions compared to others demonstrates the limitations of the Green Revolution for developing countries, where irrigated land is often low (such as 25 percent in India by 1975). Partial use of the inputs due to “too little income to buy adequate agricultural machinery, fertilisers or pesticides" (Sloman, 2006), meant that productivity was not fully increased. If you also consider that agricultural land is not homogenous, but differences come between highlands and lowlands, rain-fed and irrigated, crop and ranching (Griffin, 1991), not just throughout the world, but within regions, then it becomes obvious that such inequality is inevitable. Inequality was also accentuated by the types of HYV seeds which were available. Since wheat and rice, the main HYV seeds available were superior foods and not the staple crop they were therefore more expensive, it would require their prices to fall for benefits to accrue to the poor. However the prices did not fall and the growth of other inferior food grains fell or even became negative as farmers switched to the more lucrative HYV seeds, thus leaving the rural and urban poor worse off, as more of their income would have to go towards paying higher prices for food (Ghatak, 1998).
At a glance it seems that the New Technology adopted and Land Reforms that have occurred have been successful, when growth of output increased 25 percent from the 60s to the mid 80s[17]. However, remove China from the calculation and the performance seems much less impressive (Griffin, 1991). Including China average growth per head in Griffin’s example of 20 countries is 1.08 percent, but when China is excluded this falls dramatically to 0.49 percent. In fact, in Africa many countries have experienced agricultural decline (although the Cote d’Ivoire is an encouraging counter-example). In the 80s food grain production increased in countries which, relatively effectively, adopted new technologies (from 128 million tons in 1978-9 to 151.6 million tons in 1983-4) and of these countries India has become an exporter of rice to the world market (Ghatak, 1998). However, this does not mean that the production has been maximised (if it can be). While peasant farmers are seen to aim for maximisation when given the full chance (Ghatak, 1998) it is required that the state make sure enough insurance and credit is available to induce participation of the poorest farmers. (Todaro, 1985) However, the limited outreach of the state leads to misuses of the improvements offered. For example, in India tax evasion was high, the state subsidised credit was taken by rich peasants and landlords and then sold on at higher interest rates to the poorer farmers, and the lobbying of the rich peasants helped to keep food prices high (at the expense of the poor) (Ben Crow, 1988). Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, overall agricultural productivity in all but rice crops fell, and in South America productivity fell.
In conclusion, while there are examples of countries where land reform and ‘New Technologies’ were adapted successfully[18] and development all in all was enhanced by these, there are far more examples where there was ‘New technology’ adapted with partial land reform, or almost none. This has not often brought about desirable results in alleviating poverty and increasing rural standards of living and bringing about improved development throughout the economy, as a strong political will is important to help implement co-operative and credit schemes for poor and landless peasants. Plus, the hope of only using labour intensive biological New Technologies has been quashed and thus the capital intensive, inappropriate technologies have to be adopted if the improved agricultural production is to be continued. However, there are still hopes of improving living standards through new technologies. ‘GM crops[19]’ are new improved seeds being developed, which require less herbicide and pesticide and are less harmful to the farmers’ health and are still higher yielding[20] and which are being developed my research partnerships in developed countries and developing countries[21]. However, these are being hampered by anti-GM sentiment in large demand countries Japan and throughout Europe[22]. The hope is that this may change in the future, as the gains of GM crops are realised (Paarlberg, 2002). Another hopeful development has been the recent land reform policies in Brazil. Since the mid-1990s "land reform on a massive scale [was] improved", for example in the state of Ceará where poor families obtained financing for purchasing agricultural properties[23] although this was encouraged by falling land prices at the time. Although this land reform seems promising its development should be monitored with caution. (Hans P.Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009)
[1] There are great differences between countries in Africa and Asia, where employment in agriculture is dominant, as compared to Latin America where employment in agriculture is, on average, less dominant. (Griffin, 1991)
[2] Often between 50-80 percent (Todaro, 1985)
[3] (Ghatak, 1998)
[4] Where in Argentina, Brazil and Chile minifundia yield more than twice as much as latifundia, and “the latifundia in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Chile and Guatemala are all below… the medium-sized family farms as well”.
[5] Or attempting to make enough money to pay off high interest debts to landlords and/or informal money lenders.
[6] "Poor continued to hold small patches of land that were insufficient even for subsistence farming." (Hans P.Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009)
[7] Or/and maximise rent pay.
[8] As they are satisfied in their income from rents.
[9] Taiwan: under threat of Communism from the mainland and ‘not dependent upon the political support of Taiwanese landowners’, and South Korea: urgency brought about by the Korean War and presented as ‘removing the vestiges of Japanese colonialism’.
[10] In Chile – agrarian reform led to reducing in latifundia but after 1973 coup wheat production fell to that of the 1920s, ‘when population was half of what it was today’, as state economic support to small land holders declined.
[11] In order to convince farmers unwilling to join the market with new technologies due to the risk of a ‘bad year’ when they have tried and tested ways of definitely feeding family. (Todaro, 1985)
[12] By state backed insurance or credit-lending
[13] Crops grown specifically to be sold on the (world) market.
[14] i.e. HYV seeds
[15] via (Ghatak, 1998)
[16] Labour can’t entirely be absorbed at least In the short run even if it is demanded due to the lack of structural mobility of labour, which will have undesirable effects as unemployed become dependents
[17] Somewhat explained by population expansion slowing from its 1970 peak of 2.6 per year to 2 percent per year.
[18] South Korean, Taiwan which were discussed earlier
[19] Genetically Modified crops
[20] Examples are the Bt cotton variety.
[21] Thus are more likely to be suited for developing countries needs, hopefully including more staple foods such as pulses. Also public initiatives such as HarvestPlus, that seeks to reduce micronutrient malnutrition to breed nutrient-dense staple foods (http://www.harvestplus.org).
[22] Then again, if these were going to be exported, perhaps the increased yield would not actually accrue to an improvement for the poor in the countries, unless subsidised by the state
[23] 15,200 families settled on 609 separate properties at a cost of approximately $3000 per family.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ben Crow, M. T. (1988). Survival and Change in the Third World. Norwich: Page Bros Ltd.
Cohen, S. (1978). Agrarian structures and agrarian reform. Leiden|Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Social Sciences Division.
Currie, J. (1981). The Economic Theory of Agricultural Land Tenure. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
Ghatak, S. (1998). Introduction to Development Economics (3rd Edition ed.). Padstow, Cornwall: T.J. International Ltd.
Griffin, K. (1991). Alternative Strategies for Economic Development (91 reprint ed.). Hong Kong: MACMILLAN ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL LTD.
Hans P.Binswanger-Mkhize, C. B. (2009). Agricultural Land Redistribution, Towards Greater Consensus. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Munck, R. (1984). Politics and Dependancy in the Third World; The Case of Latin America. London: Zed Books Ltd.
Paarlberg, J. I. (2002, October 4). Explaining restricted approval and availability of GM cropsin developing countries. Retrieved 3 23, 2010, from http://joelcohen.org: http://joelcohen.org/pdf/RestrictedApproval.pdf
Sloman, J. (2006). Economics (6th Edition ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
Terence K Hopkins, I. W. (1998). The Age of Transition, Trajectory of the World-System, 1945-2025. London: Zed Books.
Todaro, M. P. (1985). Economic Development in the Third World (3rd ed.). New York: Longman, Inc.
Thursday 14 January 2010
Dependency theory. Consider the defining features of dependency theory and distinguish its major variants. Discuss the extent to which it is an illuminating way of analysing the problem of underdevelopment.
Dependency theory. Consider the defining features of dependency theory and distinguish its major variants. Discuss the extent to which it is an illuminating way of analysing the problem of underdevelopment.
Dependency theory has its intellectual origins in both Structuralism and Neo-Marxism. there are many variations of dependency theory born from these different origins. These variations make it difficult to look at the theory/paradigm as a whole, but there are general agreements and three major variants can be distinguished (albeit tentatively) for the purpose of analysis(Palma, 1981). These will be: firstly the variant based on the reformulation of United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America[1] (structuralism); secondly the (neo-) Marxists, and; thirdly those who reject the creation of a mechanico-formal theory (for example Cardoso) i.e. a Marxism-cum-structuralism variant. While dependency theory is seen as radical by the mainstream economic thought its analysis can be illuminating when applied to underdevelopment, where it is more accepted by historicists and sociologists(Munck, 1984). This is because of its (eventual) attempt to go beyond a static, linear, mechanico-formulaic model, particularly in the Marxism-cum-structuralism variant.
The Structuralist (Keynesian influenced) Singer-Prebisch theory of the ‘Centre’ and ‘Periphery’ economies (i.e. developed industrial countries at the centre and underdeveloped primary-goods producing countries in the periphery, being industrialised with the spread of capitalism from the centre[2]) was generally accepted by dependency writers but they did not accept that Latin America was underdeveloped and proceeding to become developed[3], as was the mainstream belief of the time (Modernisation theory). The dependency writers instead proposed that the underdevelopment was in fact a part of the historical relationship with the central metropolis, brought about by the industrialisation[4] of the central economies and creation of the world capitalist system(Munck, 1984).
It is the works of Celso Furtado and Osvaldo Sunkel, who took and advanced upon the ECLA’s work while criticising it’s ‘naïve optimism’, which Gabriel Palma[5] and Ronaldo Munck[6] take to represent the ‘conservative’ wing of Dependency theory (the first variant). The ECLA had thought it possible to escape the deterioration of the terms of trade through ‘import substitution’ industrialisation and state intervention (Palma, 1981 p.54-55) but Furtado and Sunkel’s rethinking of the ECLA analysis was written in reaction to the apparent stagnation of the previous ECLA policy of ISI[7]. According to the new analysis, the industrialisation was hindered by the political, economic and social structures of the Latin American countries(Palma, 1981). Sunkel showed that with ‘international integration’ in the centre comes a ‘national disintegration’[8] in the periphery(Munck, 1984) while Furtado made a structural and historical analysis of development[9]. They distinguished economic growth from economic development (growth in GNP as the former and redistribution of income and national control of economic-political spheres as the latter) and questioned the ‘perverse’ growth in the periphery but not ‘the essence of capitalism’ itself(Munck, 1984), embodied in stagnationist theories. What seemed to become obvious was that, parallel to industrialisation, agrarian and land reform was a necessity (Palma, 1981) and that this could alleviate countries from dependency. They were not claiming that development was impossible without ‘a revolution of an immediately socialist nature’, as radical neo-Marxist dependency writers were, but that reform within the capitalist system would allow the escape from dependency (Palma, 1981). However, this is not to say there aren’t similarities between these ‘conservative’ dependency writers and the radical dependency writers.
Both sets of dependency writers emphasise deteriorating terms of trade, but the neo-Marxists do not believe it possible for periphery countries to escape the dependency trap within the capitalist world economic system. The neo-Marxist writer Andre Gunder Frank is the icon of dependency outside of Latin America (Munck, 1984 p10) and it is Paul Baran’s ‘The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism’ (1975) and the Marxist imperialism theory (Lenin, R. Luxemburg) that formulates the neo-Marxist variant of dependency theory. In imperialism theory the advanced nations used colonies for surplus extraction by forming bonds with the pre-capitalistic ‘indigenous’ elites, gaining direct, cheap access to resources as traditional modes of surplus extraction[10] were kept (Palma, 1981). The elites would also be negatively affected by a change to capitalist mode of production and therefore complied to the capitalist advanced nations’ wishes.
In the dependency theory the colonial ties of surplus extraction (or surplus drain) from underdeveloped countries to developed countries have been replaced by the tie of multinational companies (while ‘imperialist nations’ are merely ‘assistants’ or ‘shadows’)(Todaro, 1985). These MNCs are seen as a ‘major instrument of penetration of the periphery by the centre’ by the dependency theorists, through payment of interest, repatriated profits (i.e. those profits taken from the host country to the original country of the MNC) and ‘flight capital’ which is the exchanging of the local elites’ savings from the periphery to the centre[11] for security (Todaro, 1985). These parts represent surplus drain of the periphery, meaning that there cannot be development[12] as any surplus of the periphery country is immediately extracted. The ‘vicious circle’ theory is also rejected by neo-Marxists. Baran says that it fails to accept that the early development of capitalism required ‘primitive accumulation’ or looting of the colonies[13]. It is regarded as a weapon for the ‘creation of a climate of dependency… thus helping to perpetuate their [underdeveloped countries’] poverty’(Todaro, 1985) as it encourages them to depend on aid.
For the early neo-Marxists this surplus drain was enough of a factor to claim ‘impossibility’ of economic development, assuming that a high percentage of surplus was drained and that the part not drained was not used productively, i.e. ‘squandered’ by local elites not reinvested by a capitalist class(Palma, 1981). However this dogmatic ‘impossibility’ theory came under heavy fire as being unrealistic, which led Amin and Thomas to replace it with an ‘inappropriate pattern’ of development thesis which allows for some of the surplus left with the local elites to be employed rationally, allowing some economic development (Todaro, 1985). This accounts for the ‘observed fact’ of growth of aggregate income[14]. The ‘less-than-satisfactory’ growth is then blamed upon the countries’ belonging to the periphery of the ‘world capitalist system’(Todaro, 1985). Since this seems more accountable to the facts it would appear that the inappropriate patterns theory would be more illuminating and appropriate way of analysing the problem of underdevelopment. Nevertheless, since in both theories Latin America is already capitalist[15], all that will occur is the ‘deepening of underdevelopment’ without a socialist revolution (Munck, 1984).
Critiques of these dependency writers from other dependency writers[16] have focussed on the criticism of the theory being too ‘mechanico-formal’. Robert Brenner (1977) accuses them (particularly Frank) of being too ‘economised’ and thus failing to properly take class structures and class struggles into account(Palma, 1981). It is however, critically advanced upon by Brazilian sociologist Theotonio dos Santos, who especially dismisses Franks satellite/metropolis analysis and replaces it with “the formation of a certain type of internal structures conditioned by the international relationships of dependence” (dos Santos, 1969, p80). Distinguishing different types of dependency – colonial, industrial-financial, and industrial-technological – he and sociologists Vania Bambirra and Ruy Mauro Marini were more interested in showing the differences between countries in the periphery and their different forms of dependency[17] in contrast to Frank’s attempts at showing the similarities(Palma, 1981).
The industrial-technological dependence is seen in the relationship between MNCs and countries in the periphery. The introduction of inappropriate science and technologies which are capital intensive in countries with ‘surplus labour’[18] is one factor, along with the arguments against MNCs made earlier. Although dos Santos put forward that industrial-technological dependency[19] came after the industrial-financial dependency more recently it was been argued that a new financial dependency exists. This is USA hegemony with the dollar, put forward by Vernengo (2004)[20], especially in reference to the Bretton Woods agreement which allowed the US more freedom in respect to financial acts.
Another important judgement in dependency is that of ‘international dualism’. The concept of dualism is that of a world of dual societies – rich and poor nations as well as domestically rich and poor areas in the periphery economies. Growing international inequalities refute growth and structuralist change models. The effect of dualism is to give strong countries control and the ability to manipulate markets to their advantage, permitting them to dominate via foreign investment and exporting inappropriate science and technology to periphery countries(Todaro, 1985). However dos Santos and similar writers also fall into the trap of lumping together different social formations in the name of formalising a theory of dependence, and once again negate the class struggle, though not to the same extent as the early neo-Marxists(Palma, 1981). It is in the Structuralist-Cum-Marxist variant that this tendency is most rigorously avoided.
Cardoso is the most recognised of the Structuralist-Cum-Marxist writers. He concentrated on methodology and[21] proposed that instead of generating a general theory or model of dependency, each society must be analysed separately, analysing their specificities. They claim that diversity of national resources, geographic location and social organisation must be studied to understand the dependant societies(Palma, 1981). Cardoso dismissed the idea that ‘capitalist development in Latin America is impossible’ and while accepting that the periphery’s development is dependent upon the centre, also claimed that ‘the struggle for industrialisation’ was ‘the goal of foreign capital’, which therefore created a dependent growth. (Palma, 1981) Munck advanced upon this and called the neo-Marxist approach an ‘impoverished linear conception of history based on simplified models of exploitation’(Munck, 1984), stating Cardoso’s claim that all the theses behind it were created to support each other, making the neo-Marxist approach dysfunctional. Cardoso also analyses ‘domestic dualism’, showing the gap between the wealthy elites and the poor, as well as the gap between the modern and traditional methods of production which help emphasise the rich/poor divide[22](Todaro, 1985).
Cardoso came to believe that the prime mover in relation to the class struggle and development was politics (Munck, 1984) and wrote (with Faletto) “the relationship between internal and external forces are forming a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere external forms of exploitation”(1977, pp.10,11)[23]. They claimed that it came down to the relationship between the local elite classes and the external international forces, and the relationship between the local elite and the local classes being dominated. This seems to be a more illuminating point of view; however its limitations are pointed out by Palma when he writes that the historicism of the variant, while helping it progress from other dependency theories also shows its problem: that ambiguities and surprises will always crop up in historical analysis(Palma, 1981, p. 62).
Among those who critique the dependency theorists, Warren is one of the most adamant. Following on from Geoffrey Kay’s conceptual argument that dependency wasn’t caused by the exploitation by capital of the underdeveloped countries, but that it didn’t exploit them enough, calling for a ‘return to Marx’[24](Munck, 1984, pp. 20-21) , Warren argues that capitalism is an instrument of social advance[25], and that it was ‘through imperialism… that revolutionary seeds were sowed in the rest of the world’[26](Munck, 1984). Also questioning the concept of various dependency theories is Lall, who argues that the reasons stated for the underdevelopment of the dependent countries are also characteristics of ‘non-dependent’ countries, making them just an analysis of capitalism. He says that analysing these does not show a ‘causal relationship between these characteristics and underdevelopment’(Palma, 1981), arguing that they are therefore not illuminating for analysis of underdevelopment.
To add to the conceptual critique Thomas Weisskopf and Warren investigate the empirical evidence of dependency. Weisskopf takes Lall’s analysis and adds the empirical data to support it (Palma, 1981) while Warren uses data himself. However, the empirical analysis should be questioned. Warren takes the example of Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea to show that dependency writers often underestimate the spread of capitalism, but Munck does not accept that these countries necessarily represent the Third World, arguing that the capitalist penetration is uneven and statistical data not always entirely useful[27](1984). Warren’s attack on income redistribution ‘for its own sake’ being ‘unjust’ (Munck, 1984, p. 21) can also be counter-argued, as Todaro writes: “there are…general reasons why many development economists now believe the above argument [[28]] to be incorrect and why greater equality in developing countries may in fact be a condition for self-sustaining economic growth”(Todaro, 1985, pp. 159,160). Another argument is that the example of South Korea shows a protectionist, authoritarian and export driven development (Griffin, 1989, pp. 121-128) in contrast to the ISI policies of the Latin American countries which had exacerbated the technological dependency and therefore cannot be directly compared in terms of dependency[29].
While there are distinct arguments against the dependency theories presented, there are cases where dependency theorists fit the facts, i.e. Amin’s ‘inappropriate patterns theory’. To want a purely economical underdevelopment theory would be folly and it must be seen in respect to political, social and anthropomorphic circumstances as well as economic ones. Therefore, purely economic theories, including early neo-Marxist dependency theory seems less than adequate particularly when as polemic as Andre Gunder Frank’s writings. In particular the works of Cardoso and others seem to be the furthest reaching and most useful for a full on approach to dependency and underdevelopment. The increased use of historical analysis, taken from concrete situations is a positive point: taking theories beyond the abstract is important for making analysis illuminating. Thus, considering all these points, it would be extremely unfair to dismiss the dependency theories completely.
Bibliography
Frank, A. G. (1984). Critique and Anti-Critique Essays on Dependence and Reformism. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd.
Griffin, K. (1989). Alternative Strategies for Economic Development (91 reprint ed.). Hong Kong: MACMILLAN ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL LTD.
Munck, R. (1984). Politics and Dependancy in the Third World; The Case of Latin America. London: Zed Books Ltd.
Palma, G. (1981). Dependancy Theory A Critical Reassessment. (D. Seers, Ed.) London: Frances Pinter (Publishers) Ltd.
Todaro, M. P. (1985). Economic Development in the Third World (3rd ed.). New York: Longman, Inc.
[1] Otherwise known as the ECLA
[2] As advocated and adopted by the influential ECLA
[3] As in the transition from feudalism to capitalism via industrialisation
[4] Rise of capital(ism)
[5] (Dependancy Theory A Critical Reassessment, 1981)
[6] (Politics and Dependancy in the Third World; The Case of Latin America, 1984)
[7] Although it also tied in some ways to the Cuban revolution and growing nationalism, such as the Allende regime in Chile [Frank, 1984]
[8] An increased gap between rich and poor in the country
[9] Furtado, C. (1970) Economic Development in Latin America. A Survey from Colonial times to the Cuban Revolution. Cambridge, Cambridge university press
[10] For example; plantations owned by land-owners who copied expenditure patterns of the centre and therefore replaced the surplus to the centre (Todaro, 1985)
[11] Or the satellite to the metropolis, respectively, in Andre Gunder Frank’s terminology (Munck, 1984)
[12] The surplus made by the country needs to be put into development for development to occur
[13] and Russia, through Stalinist tyranny, something similar. P. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968)
[14] which Baran’s more radical theory cannot allow. Frank calls the impossibility of deveopment ‘the development of under-development’ as where there is positive growth of the centre/metropolis then there will be negative growth is the periphery. Amin calls this ‘dependant development’.
[15] Since the colonisation of Latin America by Spain
[16] Within what we have called the Marxist variant; evidence of how hard it is to categorise properly the different variants.
[17] (Munck, 1984)
[18] Labour which could be employed productively but currently is being employed for use in unproductive activity, e.g. family farm where the work of 2 people may be done by the whole family.
[19] Which was strengthened by the ISI policies recommended by the ECLA (Palma, 1981).
[20] Matias Vernengo, "Technology, Finance and Dependency: Latin American Radical Political Economy in Retospect", Working Paper No: 2004-06, University of Utah Dept. of Economics, 2004
[21] in his critique of the neo-Marxist approach
[22] The ‘spread effect’ is also questioned when studying domestic dualism, where traditionally a ‘trickle-down’ from industrialised sectors to others would be expected, there is little evidence of it happening[22] (Todaro, 1985).
[23] Extract from (Palma, 1981)
[24] Although, Munck points out that what Marx said was actually that the more backward country will “suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompletedness of that development”. (Munck, 1984, p. 20)
[25] as regards to Marx’s generally progressive nature of capitalism
[26] Warren, B. (1980) Imperialism, p.136 << extracted from (Munck, 1984)
[27] The problem of statistical data is perhaps best exemplified by Munck in his example where Libya’s gross national product (per capita) in 1980 was $8,640, comparing well with Britain’s $7,920 and even the USA’s $9,363. Despite these statistics, Libya has not been elevated from the Third World (in 1984)(Munck, 1984).
[28] [that an economy characterized by highly unequal distributions of income would save more and grow faster than one with a more equitable distribution of income]
[29] Plus it is possible that it was mainly related to the political occurrences of the time, i.e. splitting of korea into north/south.(Griffin, 1989)
Dependency theory has its intellectual origins in both Structuralism and Neo-Marxism. there are many variations of dependency theory born from these different origins. These variations make it difficult to look at the theory/paradigm as a whole, but there are general agreements and three major variants can be distinguished (albeit tentatively) for the purpose of analysis(Palma, 1981). These will be: firstly the variant based on the reformulation of United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America[1] (structuralism); secondly the (neo-) Marxists, and; thirdly those who reject the creation of a mechanico-formal theory (for example Cardoso) i.e. a Marxism-cum-structuralism variant. While dependency theory is seen as radical by the mainstream economic thought its analysis can be illuminating when applied to underdevelopment, where it is more accepted by historicists and sociologists(Munck, 1984). This is because of its (eventual) attempt to go beyond a static, linear, mechanico-formulaic model, particularly in the Marxism-cum-structuralism variant.
The Structuralist (Keynesian influenced) Singer-Prebisch theory of the ‘Centre’ and ‘Periphery’ economies (i.e. developed industrial countries at the centre and underdeveloped primary-goods producing countries in the periphery, being industrialised with the spread of capitalism from the centre[2]) was generally accepted by dependency writers but they did not accept that Latin America was underdeveloped and proceeding to become developed[3], as was the mainstream belief of the time (Modernisation theory). The dependency writers instead proposed that the underdevelopment was in fact a part of the historical relationship with the central metropolis, brought about by the industrialisation[4] of the central economies and creation of the world capitalist system(Munck, 1984).
It is the works of Celso Furtado and Osvaldo Sunkel, who took and advanced upon the ECLA’s work while criticising it’s ‘naïve optimism’, which Gabriel Palma[5] and Ronaldo Munck[6] take to represent the ‘conservative’ wing of Dependency theory (the first variant). The ECLA had thought it possible to escape the deterioration of the terms of trade through ‘import substitution’ industrialisation and state intervention (Palma, 1981 p.54-55) but Furtado and Sunkel’s rethinking of the ECLA analysis was written in reaction to the apparent stagnation of the previous ECLA policy of ISI[7]. According to the new analysis, the industrialisation was hindered by the political, economic and social structures of the Latin American countries(Palma, 1981). Sunkel showed that with ‘international integration’ in the centre comes a ‘national disintegration’[8] in the periphery(Munck, 1984) while Furtado made a structural and historical analysis of development[9]. They distinguished economic growth from economic development (growth in GNP as the former and redistribution of income and national control of economic-political spheres as the latter) and questioned the ‘perverse’ growth in the periphery but not ‘the essence of capitalism’ itself(Munck, 1984), embodied in stagnationist theories. What seemed to become obvious was that, parallel to industrialisation, agrarian and land reform was a necessity (Palma, 1981) and that this could alleviate countries from dependency. They were not claiming that development was impossible without ‘a revolution of an immediately socialist nature’, as radical neo-Marxist dependency writers were, but that reform within the capitalist system would allow the escape from dependency (Palma, 1981). However, this is not to say there aren’t similarities between these ‘conservative’ dependency writers and the radical dependency writers.
Both sets of dependency writers emphasise deteriorating terms of trade, but the neo-Marxists do not believe it possible for periphery countries to escape the dependency trap within the capitalist world economic system. The neo-Marxist writer Andre Gunder Frank is the icon of dependency outside of Latin America (Munck, 1984 p10) and it is Paul Baran’s ‘The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism’ (1975) and the Marxist imperialism theory (Lenin, R. Luxemburg) that formulates the neo-Marxist variant of dependency theory. In imperialism theory the advanced nations used colonies for surplus extraction by forming bonds with the pre-capitalistic ‘indigenous’ elites, gaining direct, cheap access to resources as traditional modes of surplus extraction[10] were kept (Palma, 1981). The elites would also be negatively affected by a change to capitalist mode of production and therefore complied to the capitalist advanced nations’ wishes.
In the dependency theory the colonial ties of surplus extraction (or surplus drain) from underdeveloped countries to developed countries have been replaced by the tie of multinational companies (while ‘imperialist nations’ are merely ‘assistants’ or ‘shadows’)(Todaro, 1985). These MNCs are seen as a ‘major instrument of penetration of the periphery by the centre’ by the dependency theorists, through payment of interest, repatriated profits (i.e. those profits taken from the host country to the original country of the MNC) and ‘flight capital’ which is the exchanging of the local elites’ savings from the periphery to the centre[11] for security (Todaro, 1985). These parts represent surplus drain of the periphery, meaning that there cannot be development[12] as any surplus of the periphery country is immediately extracted. The ‘vicious circle’ theory is also rejected by neo-Marxists. Baran says that it fails to accept that the early development of capitalism required ‘primitive accumulation’ or looting of the colonies[13]. It is regarded as a weapon for the ‘creation of a climate of dependency… thus helping to perpetuate their [underdeveloped countries’] poverty’(Todaro, 1985) as it encourages them to depend on aid.
For the early neo-Marxists this surplus drain was enough of a factor to claim ‘impossibility’ of economic development, assuming that a high percentage of surplus was drained and that the part not drained was not used productively, i.e. ‘squandered’ by local elites not reinvested by a capitalist class(Palma, 1981). However this dogmatic ‘impossibility’ theory came under heavy fire as being unrealistic, which led Amin and Thomas to replace it with an ‘inappropriate pattern’ of development thesis which allows for some of the surplus left with the local elites to be employed rationally, allowing some economic development (Todaro, 1985). This accounts for the ‘observed fact’ of growth of aggregate income[14]. The ‘less-than-satisfactory’ growth is then blamed upon the countries’ belonging to the periphery of the ‘world capitalist system’(Todaro, 1985). Since this seems more accountable to the facts it would appear that the inappropriate patterns theory would be more illuminating and appropriate way of analysing the problem of underdevelopment. Nevertheless, since in both theories Latin America is already capitalist[15], all that will occur is the ‘deepening of underdevelopment’ without a socialist revolution (Munck, 1984).
Critiques of these dependency writers from other dependency writers[16] have focussed on the criticism of the theory being too ‘mechanico-formal’. Robert Brenner (1977) accuses them (particularly Frank) of being too ‘economised’ and thus failing to properly take class structures and class struggles into account(Palma, 1981). It is however, critically advanced upon by Brazilian sociologist Theotonio dos Santos, who especially dismisses Franks satellite/metropolis analysis and replaces it with “the formation of a certain type of internal structures conditioned by the international relationships of dependence” (dos Santos, 1969, p80). Distinguishing different types of dependency – colonial, industrial-financial, and industrial-technological – he and sociologists Vania Bambirra and Ruy Mauro Marini were more interested in showing the differences between countries in the periphery and their different forms of dependency[17] in contrast to Frank’s attempts at showing the similarities(Palma, 1981).
The industrial-technological dependence is seen in the relationship between MNCs and countries in the periphery. The introduction of inappropriate science and technologies which are capital intensive in countries with ‘surplus labour’[18] is one factor, along with the arguments against MNCs made earlier. Although dos Santos put forward that industrial-technological dependency[19] came after the industrial-financial dependency more recently it was been argued that a new financial dependency exists. This is USA hegemony with the dollar, put forward by Vernengo (2004)[20], especially in reference to the Bretton Woods agreement which allowed the US more freedom in respect to financial acts.
Another important judgement in dependency is that of ‘international dualism’. The concept of dualism is that of a world of dual societies – rich and poor nations as well as domestically rich and poor areas in the periphery economies. Growing international inequalities refute growth and structuralist change models. The effect of dualism is to give strong countries control and the ability to manipulate markets to their advantage, permitting them to dominate via foreign investment and exporting inappropriate science and technology to periphery countries(Todaro, 1985). However dos Santos and similar writers also fall into the trap of lumping together different social formations in the name of formalising a theory of dependence, and once again negate the class struggle, though not to the same extent as the early neo-Marxists(Palma, 1981). It is in the Structuralist-Cum-Marxist variant that this tendency is most rigorously avoided.
Cardoso is the most recognised of the Structuralist-Cum-Marxist writers. He concentrated on methodology and[21] proposed that instead of generating a general theory or model of dependency, each society must be analysed separately, analysing their specificities. They claim that diversity of national resources, geographic location and social organisation must be studied to understand the dependant societies(Palma, 1981). Cardoso dismissed the idea that ‘capitalist development in Latin America is impossible’ and while accepting that the periphery’s development is dependent upon the centre, also claimed that ‘the struggle for industrialisation’ was ‘the goal of foreign capital’, which therefore created a dependent growth. (Palma, 1981) Munck advanced upon this and called the neo-Marxist approach an ‘impoverished linear conception of history based on simplified models of exploitation’(Munck, 1984), stating Cardoso’s claim that all the theses behind it were created to support each other, making the neo-Marxist approach dysfunctional. Cardoso also analyses ‘domestic dualism’, showing the gap between the wealthy elites and the poor, as well as the gap between the modern and traditional methods of production which help emphasise the rich/poor divide[22](Todaro, 1985).
Cardoso came to believe that the prime mover in relation to the class struggle and development was politics (Munck, 1984) and wrote (with Faletto) “the relationship between internal and external forces are forming a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere external forms of exploitation”(1977, pp.10,11)[23]. They claimed that it came down to the relationship between the local elite classes and the external international forces, and the relationship between the local elite and the local classes being dominated. This seems to be a more illuminating point of view; however its limitations are pointed out by Palma when he writes that the historicism of the variant, while helping it progress from other dependency theories also shows its problem: that ambiguities and surprises will always crop up in historical analysis(Palma, 1981, p. 62).
Among those who critique the dependency theorists, Warren is one of the most adamant. Following on from Geoffrey Kay’s conceptual argument that dependency wasn’t caused by the exploitation by capital of the underdeveloped countries, but that it didn’t exploit them enough, calling for a ‘return to Marx’[24](Munck, 1984, pp. 20-21) , Warren argues that capitalism is an instrument of social advance[25], and that it was ‘through imperialism… that revolutionary seeds were sowed in the rest of the world’[26](Munck, 1984). Also questioning the concept of various dependency theories is Lall, who argues that the reasons stated for the underdevelopment of the dependent countries are also characteristics of ‘non-dependent’ countries, making them just an analysis of capitalism. He says that analysing these does not show a ‘causal relationship between these characteristics and underdevelopment’(Palma, 1981), arguing that they are therefore not illuminating for analysis of underdevelopment.
To add to the conceptual critique Thomas Weisskopf and Warren investigate the empirical evidence of dependency. Weisskopf takes Lall’s analysis and adds the empirical data to support it (Palma, 1981) while Warren uses data himself. However, the empirical analysis should be questioned. Warren takes the example of Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea to show that dependency writers often underestimate the spread of capitalism, but Munck does not accept that these countries necessarily represent the Third World, arguing that the capitalist penetration is uneven and statistical data not always entirely useful[27](1984). Warren’s attack on income redistribution ‘for its own sake’ being ‘unjust’ (Munck, 1984, p. 21) can also be counter-argued, as Todaro writes: “there are…general reasons why many development economists now believe the above argument [[28]] to be incorrect and why greater equality in developing countries may in fact be a condition for self-sustaining economic growth”(Todaro, 1985, pp. 159,160). Another argument is that the example of South Korea shows a protectionist, authoritarian and export driven development (Griffin, 1989, pp. 121-128) in contrast to the ISI policies of the Latin American countries which had exacerbated the technological dependency and therefore cannot be directly compared in terms of dependency[29].
While there are distinct arguments against the dependency theories presented, there are cases where dependency theorists fit the facts, i.e. Amin’s ‘inappropriate patterns theory’. To want a purely economical underdevelopment theory would be folly and it must be seen in respect to political, social and anthropomorphic circumstances as well as economic ones. Therefore, purely economic theories, including early neo-Marxist dependency theory seems less than adequate particularly when as polemic as Andre Gunder Frank’s writings. In particular the works of Cardoso and others seem to be the furthest reaching and most useful for a full on approach to dependency and underdevelopment. The increased use of historical analysis, taken from concrete situations is a positive point: taking theories beyond the abstract is important for making analysis illuminating. Thus, considering all these points, it would be extremely unfair to dismiss the dependency theories completely.
Bibliography
Frank, A. G. (1984). Critique and Anti-Critique Essays on Dependence and Reformism. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd.
Griffin, K. (1989). Alternative Strategies for Economic Development (91 reprint ed.). Hong Kong: MACMILLAN ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL LTD.
Munck, R. (1984). Politics and Dependancy in the Third World; The Case of Latin America. London: Zed Books Ltd.
Palma, G. (1981). Dependancy Theory A Critical Reassessment. (D. Seers, Ed.) London: Frances Pinter (Publishers) Ltd.
Todaro, M. P. (1985). Economic Development in the Third World (3rd ed.). New York: Longman, Inc.
[1] Otherwise known as the ECLA
[2] As advocated and adopted by the influential ECLA
[3] As in the transition from feudalism to capitalism via industrialisation
[4] Rise of capital(ism)
[5] (Dependancy Theory A Critical Reassessment, 1981)
[6] (Politics and Dependancy in the Third World; The Case of Latin America, 1984)
[7] Although it also tied in some ways to the Cuban revolution and growing nationalism, such as the Allende regime in Chile [Frank, 1984]
[8] An increased gap between rich and poor in the country
[9] Furtado, C. (1970) Economic Development in Latin America. A Survey from Colonial times to the Cuban Revolution. Cambridge, Cambridge university press
[10] For example; plantations owned by land-owners who copied expenditure patterns of the centre and therefore replaced the surplus to the centre (Todaro, 1985)
[11] Or the satellite to the metropolis, respectively, in Andre Gunder Frank’s terminology (Munck, 1984)
[12] The surplus made by the country needs to be put into development for development to occur
[13] and Russia, through Stalinist tyranny, something similar. P. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968)
[14] which Baran’s more radical theory cannot allow. Frank calls the impossibility of deveopment ‘the development of under-development’ as where there is positive growth of the centre/metropolis then there will be negative growth is the periphery. Amin calls this ‘dependant development’.
[15] Since the colonisation of Latin America by Spain
[16] Within what we have called the Marxist variant; evidence of how hard it is to categorise properly the different variants.
[17] (Munck, 1984)
[18] Labour which could be employed productively but currently is being employed for use in unproductive activity, e.g. family farm where the work of 2 people may be done by the whole family.
[19] Which was strengthened by the ISI policies recommended by the ECLA (Palma, 1981).
[20] Matias Vernengo, "Technology, Finance and Dependency: Latin American Radical Political Economy in Retospect", Working Paper No: 2004-06, University of Utah Dept. of Economics, 2004
[21] in his critique of the neo-Marxist approach
[22] The ‘spread effect’ is also questioned when studying domestic dualism, where traditionally a ‘trickle-down’ from industrialised sectors to others would be expected, there is little evidence of it happening[22] (Todaro, 1985).
[23] Extract from (Palma, 1981)
[24] Although, Munck points out that what Marx said was actually that the more backward country will “suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompletedness of that development”. (Munck, 1984, p. 20)
[25] as regards to Marx’s generally progressive nature of capitalism
[26] Warren, B. (1980) Imperialism, p.136 << extracted from (Munck, 1984)
[27] The problem of statistical data is perhaps best exemplified by Munck in his example where Libya’s gross national product (per capita) in 1980 was $8,640, comparing well with Britain’s $7,920 and even the USA’s $9,363. Despite these statistics, Libya has not been elevated from the Third World (in 1984)(Munck, 1984).
[28] [that an economy characterized by highly unequal distributions of income would save more and grow faster than one with a more equitable distribution of income]
[29] Plus it is possible that it was mainly related to the political occurrences of the time, i.e. splitting of korea into north/south.(Griffin, 1989)
Thursday 7 January 2010
realpol
ok, so countries dont need to nd very well shouldnt follow some sort of awful idealism, but look out for themselves, get in with one of the big guys nd hope its all great after the war, unless we can manage th population increase, then, its probs just all fine, cpt in local scarcity probs as seen in sudan
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